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Abstract
The authors develop an index of ﬁnancial stress for the Canadian ﬁnancial system. Stress is
deﬁned as the force exerted on economic agents by uncertainty and changing expectations of loss
in ﬁnancial markets and institutions. It is a continuous variable with a spectrum of values, where
extreme values are called ﬁnancial crises. Information about ﬁnancial stress is extracted from a
wide array of ﬁnancial variables using several techniques, including factor analysis, econometric
benchmarking,andgeneralizedautoregressiveconditionalheteroscedasticity(GARCH)modelling.
An internal Bank of Canada survey is used to condition the choice of variables and to evaluate
their ability to reﬂect the responses to the survey regarding highly stressful ﬁnancial events. The
authors show that alternative measures of ﬁnancial crises suggested by the literature do not
accurately reﬂect the results of the survey, while several measures developed in this paper do
reﬂect them.
JEL classiﬁcation: G10, E5
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions; Financial markets
Résumé
Les auteurs élaborent un indice de stress ﬁnancier pour le système ﬁnancier canadien. Le stress
est déﬁni comme la tension ressentie par les agents économiques du fait de l’incertitude et des
modiﬁcations des attentes de pertes dans les institutions et les marchés ﬁnanciers. Il se présente
comme un continuum prenant toute une série de valeurs et dont les extrêmes sont appelés crises
ﬁnancières. L’information au sujet du stress ﬁnancier est extraite d’un large éventail de variables
ﬁnancières à l’aide de plusieurs méthodes, dont l’analyse factorielle, l’étalonnage économétrique
et le recours à des modèles autorégressifs conditionnellement hétéroscédastiques généralisés
(GARCH). Le choix des variables examinées s’inspire d’une enquête interne que la Banque du
Canada a menée pour déterminer quels événements ont occasionné le plus de stress au système
ﬁnancier canadien. Les auteurs évaluent ensuite la capacité de ces variables à reﬂéter les réponses
données à l’enquête. Ils montrent que les divers indices proposés dans la littérature ne sont pas
satisfaisants, alors que plusieurs de leurs propres mesures donnent de bons résultats.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G10, E5
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières; Marchés ﬁnanciers1
1. Introduction
This paper formalizes the concept of ﬁnancial stress, proposes competing ordinal measures of
stress, and evaluates which measure conforms most closely with responses to a Bank of Canada
survey regarding highly stressful ﬁnancial events. Financial stress is deﬁned as the force exerted
on economic agents by uncertainty and changing expectations of loss in ﬁnancial markets and
institutions. Financial stress is a continuum, measured in this paper with an index called the
Financial Stress Index (FSI), where extreme values are called ﬁnancial crises.
The literature on financial crises devotes little attention to actually measuring the contemporaneous
severity of these crises. In fact, crises are most often measured by simple binary variables.
Moreover, crises are usually treated as banking and/or currency phenomena, rather than system-
wide events. The literature on ﬁnancial crises in developing countries is quite extensive, and
numerous models using early-warning indicators (EWIs) have been created.1 However, these
models have not been successfully applied to highly developed countries, owing to the rarity of
crises in large mature markets.
The FSI addresses the weakness inherent in models that use EWIs by improving the reference
variable. In particular, the FSI is continuous, of high frequency (daily), and covers the equity
markets, bond markets, foreign exchange markets, and the banking sector. Therefore, it is far
better suited to analyzing ﬁnancial stability in highly developed countries with numerous
systemically important ﬁnancial markets and institutions.
The FSI also provides a timely snapshot of contemporaneous stress in the Canadian ﬁnancial
system. Until now, the lack of a comprehensive measure has made it difﬁcult to gauge the severity
of ﬁnancial events as they transpire.
To develop our FSI, we conducted an internal Bank of Canada survey to determine which events
over the past 25 years were most stressful for Canada’s ﬁnancial system. With the survey results
in hand, variables are then selected according to a literature review and combined into indexes.
The variables are also chosen for their timeliness, forward-looking information, systemic
relevance, and ability to reﬂect agents’ behaviour. The constructed indexes are evaluated based on
their ability to match the results of the survey. Therefore, our FSI more directly reﬂects the
Canadian experience than measures suggested by the literature.
1. Appendix A provides a brief review of the literature on EWIs.2
Section 2 clariﬁes the concept of ﬁnancial stress. Section 3 reviews the measures commonly used
in the literature to deﬁne extreme stress events (i.e., crises). Section 4 brieﬂy describes the results
of the survey on ﬁnancial stress. Section 5 describes the variables chosen, conditioned on the
literature and information gleaned from the survey. Section 6 describes how to best combine these
variables into a single index. Section 7 compares the various versions of the FSI and the measures
suggested in the literature with the survey responses. Section 8 concludes and suggests avenues
for future research.
2. Conceptualizing Financial Stress
If ﬁnancial stress is systemic, economic behaviour can be altered sufﬁciently to have adverse
effects on the real economy.2 Therefore, ﬁnancial stress is a continuous variable with a spectrum
of values, where extreme values are called a crisis. Stress increases with expected ﬁnancial loss,
with risk (a widening in the distribution of probable loss), or with uncertainty (lower conﬁdence
about the shape of the distribution of probable loss).
This paper attempts to derive an ordinal estimate of macroeconomic ﬁnancial stress in the form of
an index. A variety of measures of probable loss, risk, and uncertainty are compiled from the
banking, foreign exchange, debt, and equity markets (the four most important credit channels in
Canada). Stress in the household sector and the non-ﬁnancial business sector is implicitly
reﬂected in the behaviour of agents in these four markets.
Stress is the product of a vulnerable structure and some exogenous shock. Financial fragility
describes weaknesses in ﬁnancial conditions and/or in the structure of the ﬁnancial system. A
shock is more likely to result in stress (in the extreme, a crisis) when ﬁnancial conditions are
weak; for example, when cash ﬂows diminish rapidly, balance sheets are highly leveraged, or
lenders become more risk-averse. Shocks may also propagate through weakness in the structure
of the ﬁnancial system, as when there are market coordination failures, or computer systems
become overloaded, or the ﬂow of information is highly asymmetric. The size of the shock and
the interaction of ﬁnancial-system fragilities determine the level of stress (Diagram 1).
2. This conforms tothe Group of Ten (2001) deﬁnition of ﬁnancial crisis as “an event that will trigger a
loss ineconomic value or conﬁdence in a substantial portion of the ﬁnancial system that is serious
enough to...h a v esigniﬁcant adverse effects on the real economy.”3
3. The Literature on Identifying Crises and Measuring Financial
Stress
Many empirical studies of ﬁnancial stability focus on selecting EWIs of crises, but most use
simple deﬁnitions of the crises themselves. Typically, crises are identiﬁed with binary variables
based on extreme values of one or two underlying ﬁnancial variables. Crises in different markets
are usually considered separately.
This section describes the variables used in the literature to deﬁne a crisis. Table 1 details these
variables and gives some of our own suggestions. Section 5 describes our choice of variables
based on this review.
3.1  Banking crises/stress
Because of the lack of suitable data and institutional differences across countries, it can be
challenging to deﬁne a banking crisis; the analysis relies mostly on qualitative information. Many
studies avoid explicitly deﬁning banking crises and rely on judgment. For example, Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1996, 1999) and Logan (2000) deﬁne banking crises on an ad hoc basis as a
combination of country-speciﬁc events. But a few studies have addressed the issue directly.
Examples include Bordo (1985, 1986), who deﬁnes a banking crisis as a situation where actual or
incipient bank runs or failures lead banks to suspend the internal convertibility of their liabilities
(i.e. they are unable to meet their obligations). Caprio and Kilingebiel (1996) deﬁne a systemic
banking crisis as an instance in which bank failures or suspensions lead to the exhaustion of much
or all bank capital. Based on the extent of the problem, they identify crises of various degrees of















Diagram 1: Schematic of Financial Stress
stress
Fragility4
More recent papers combine this qualitative approach with a limited number of quantitative
criteria. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) deﬁne a banking crisis as a
situation where at least one of the following conditions holds: (i) the ratio of non-performing
assets to total assets is greater than 10 per cent,3 (ii) the cost of the rescue operation is at least 2 per
cent of GDP, (iii) banking problems result in the large-scale nationalization of banks, and (iv)
extensive bank runs lead to emergency measures.
A more quantitative method of identifying a banking crisis involves the use of aggregate balance-
sheet data. The literature frequently uses three measures to identify bank balance-sheet problems:
(i) the stock of non-performing loans as a percentage of total assets (Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini 1998; González-Hermosillo 1999), (ii) bank deposits as a percentage of GDP (Hardy and
Pazarbasioglu 1998), and (iii) lending as a percentage of GDP (Hardy and Pazarbasioglu 1998;
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1996).
The above-noted studies almost exclusively address banking sector problems in developing
countries. Vila (2000), however, proposes two measures of banking stress for the United States:
the ﬁrst based on falling bank equity prices, and the second on unsustainable aggregate deposit
growth.4
3.2  Foreign exchange crises/stress
Foreign exchange (currency) crises are usually deﬁned as signiﬁcant devaluations, losses in
reserves, and/or defensive interest rate increases.
Frankel and Rose (1996) deﬁne a currency crisis as a nominal depreciation of at least 25 per cent
that exceeds the previous year’s change by a margin of at least 10 percentage points. To take into
account the possibility of government intervention in case of a speculative attack, Kaminsky,
Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) and Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (2000) take a weighted average
of exchange rate changes and reserve losses. They then deﬁne crisis thresholds in terms of
standard deviations from the mean. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) use a similar measure,
but employ multiple thresholds to achieve a graded index. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz
3. The ratio of banking sector non-performing loans to total loans (in this paper, loans and assets are
consideredtobesynonymous)peakedat2.5percentinCanadain1993,4percentintheUnitedStates
during the Savings and Loans crisis, 10 per cent during the early-1990s Scandinavian banking crisis,
andwereestimatedbyJapaneseauthoritiestobe8percentbytheendof1999.DuringtheAsiancrisis,
theratiopeakedat8percentinKorea,19percentinMalaysia,48percentinThailand,and49percent
in Indonesia (Cortavarria et al. 2000).
4. Vilaacknowledgesthatrapidaggregatedepositgrowthmayreﬂectmacroeconomicfactorsratherthan
excessive bank lending.5
(1995, 1996) and Hawkins and Klau (2000) include hikes in interest rates to reﬂect government
intervention intended to avert a crisis. They use a scoring system that maps the variables in the
index onto ﬁve arbitrarily chosen bands.
These approaches, which essentially proxy stress with volatility measures, “have been criticized
because they ignore potentially important information about the stochastic process that generates
exchange rates” (Sauer and Bohara 2001, 135). The proposed solution has been to use
autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) or general ARCH (GARCH) models, in the
Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) traditions, respectively, to proxy exchange rate volatility,
because those models can take into account skewed distributions.
Sauer and Bohara (2001) proxy real exchange rate (et) risk in several ways, including using the
conditional variance (ht) of a ﬁrst-order ARCH model,
ln(et) = a0 + a1ln(et-1) + ut,
where ut ~ N(0,ht) and hit = b0 + b1u2
t-1.
In addition, traditional Black-Scholes (1973) options pricing models can be used to back out
implied currency volatility. Because of the forward-looking nature of option prices, implied
volatility may act as a better gauge of risk and thereby a better proxy of stress in currency markets
than traditional volatility measures.5
3.3  Debt crises/stress
Bordo and Schwartz (2000) characterize a debt crisis as the inability of sovereign nations or the
broad private sector to service foreign debts. The majority of the literature on debt crises relates to
a group of emerging economies that were exposed to severe external indebtedness in the early
1980s. These countries are identiﬁed mainly based on qualitative information. For example, in
1986 the then-U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker identiﬁed 15 countries that were subject to
external debt problems and therefore were the focus of attention under the so-called Baker plan
(Kamin 1999; Dooley 1994).
5. The assumption of log-normality behind the Black-Scholes model limitsits usefulness, however,
particularly in modelling asset prices the distribution of which isnon-normal or unknown.6
3.4  Equity crises/stress
Most studies deﬁne equity crises as a sharp decline in the overall market index. The decline can be
indicative of greater expected loss, higher dispersion of probable loss (higher risk), or increased
uncertainty about the return of ﬁrms.
Risk can also be derived from ARCH or GARCH models, or from Black-Scholes options pricing
models, as described above for currency markets. Patel and Sarkar (1998) identify equity-market
crises in eight developed countries and 14 emerging-market countries using the CMAX method (a
hybrid volatility-loss measure),
CMAXt = xt / max [ x  (xt-j| j = 0,1,...,T ) ],
where x is the stock market index. The moving window is determined by T, and it is usually 1 to 2
years. That is, CMAX compares the current value of a variable with its maximum value over the
previous T periods. Vila (2000) uses the CMAX method to identify periods of sharp decline in the
stock market, where the trigger level is chosen at either 1.5 or 2 standard deviations below the
mean of the series. Some authors deﬁne crises based on judgment rather than standard deviations.
3.5  Overall ﬁnancial crises/stress
There are few measures in the literature that resemble an overall FSI for developed countries. The
Bank Credit Analyst (BCA) produces a monthly FSI for the United States, and it is the only other
measure to actually call itself a stress index. Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000) construct a
ﬁnancial instability index, where their choice of variables makes it similar to a lagging stress
index. Therefore, we refer to their index as an FSI for the remainder of this paper. JP Morgan
produces a daily Liquidity, Credit and Volatility Index (LCVI), which resembles in many respects
a stress index as deﬁned in this paper.
The BCA’s FSI for the United States is based on the following variables: (i) the performance of
major U.S. banks’ share prices relative to the overall market, (ii) short- and long-term quality
credit spreads, (iii) private sector indebtedness, (iv) stock market leverage,6 (v) overall stock
market performance, (vi) consumer conﬁdence,7 (vii) the slope of the yield curve,8 and (viii)
stock and bond issuance.9 The variables are measured as deviations from trend10 and divided by
6. Stock market leverage is calculated in two ways: the market price-earnings ratio and the ratio of
corporate debt to cashﬂow. Both yield very similar results after subtracting the mean and dividing by
the standard deviation of each series.
7. “To capture the economic cycle and consumer stress” (McClellan 2001).
8. “As a measure of monetary policy” (ibid).
9. “As a measure of how well the market is functioning” (ibid).
10. Long-run and moving averages are bothused, depending on the series.
Î7
their historical standard deviations. The BCA’s FSI is not based on a regression equation, because
“it would be difﬁcult to establish what the dependent variable should be” (McClellan 2001). High
levels of the U.S. version of the index have been associated with ﬁnancial turbulence of one kind
or another. Figure 1 shows the result of applying the BCA approach to Canadian data.
The Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000) index includes: (i) bank failures, (ii) non-ﬁnancial
business bankruptcies, (iii) an ex post real interest rate, and (iv) an interest rate quality spread.
Figure 2 illustrates the result of applying the Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock technique to Canadian
data. After the Great Depression, Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock replace the U.S. bank failure rate
with the aggregate net loan charge-off rate.11 For the Canadian version, loan-loss provisions as a
percentage of revenues are used. The variables are standardized and summed to form a composite
index, as follows:
,
where wj is the weight on each variable,  is the median of Xj, and  is a specially
calculated standard deviation. When Xj
t is above the median,  is the standard deviation of all
the values of Xj
t that are above the median and the same number of artiﬁcially generated equi-
distant values that are below this median (Diagram 2). When Xj
t is below the median,  is the
standard deviation of all Xj
t that are below the median and the same number of equidistant values
that are above the median. Similarly, Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock deﬁne ﬁve classes of ﬁnancial
stress based on the deviation of this index from its subperiod median.12
11. The value of loan charge-offs at commercial banks divided by total commercial bank assets.





















Diagram 2: Hypothetical Visual Demonstration of the Bordo,




The JP Morgan LCVI contains seven components: (i) the U.S. Treasury curve error (the rolling
standard deviation of the spread between on-the-run and off-the-run U.S. treasury bills and bonds
along the entire maturity curve), (ii) the 10-year U.S. swap spread, (iii) JP Morgan’s Emerging
Markets Bond Index (EMBI+), (iv) U.S. high-yield spreads,13 (v) foreign exchange volatility,14
(vi) equity volatility (VIX),15 and (vii) the JP Morgan Global Risk Appetite Index.16
The index is constructed as follows. First, data for each variable are arranged to generate a sample
cumulative distribution function (CDF). The data are then divided into percentiles based on this
distribution. This transformation does not require the assumption of normality, as with standardized
units (Prat-Gay and McCormick 1999). The transformed variables are then summed equally to
create the overall LCVI. The index is benchmarked to its 50-day moving average, where values
greater than one standard deviation above the benchmark are interpreted as a signal of systemic
risk aversion (Caglayan 2002). However, no theoretical argument about investor preferences is
made to justify this interpretation. Instead, we interpret the variables as measures of risk and
expected loss.
 The LCVI is shown in Figure 3. Note that time-series data for all of the LCVI components are
available only from 1998 onwards and applied to global and U.S. markets, rather than the
Canadian ﬁnancial system speciﬁcally. Therefore, the LCVI is shown for interest, but is not used
in subsequent empirical analysis.
4. Results of a Survey on Financial Stress in Canada
We conducted a survey of senior Bank of Canada policy-makers and economists to establish a
consensus on which events have been the most stressful for Canadian markets over the past 25
years, and for what reasons. Forty questionnaires were distributed. Respondents included a former
governor, three governing council members, eight senior bank ofﬁcers, twelve bank ofﬁcers, and
three analysts. The questionnaire is shown in Appendix B.
13. B2-rated U.S. industrial companies.
14. The weighted average of 12-month implied volatilities of each of the euro, yen, Swiss franc, U.K.
pound, Canadian dollar, and Australian dollar expressed in U.S. dollars and weighted by daily
turnover.
15. The Chicago Board of Exchange equity volatility index (VIX). The VIX is based on the weighted
average of the implied volatilities of eight equity option calls and puts.
16. TheGlobalRiskAppetiteIndex(GRAI)istheSpearman’sRho(rankcorrelation)offoreignexchange
excess return rankings, measured as the difference between future and spotprices for a basket of
currencies at time t, and the risk ranking of those currencies based on their respective two-month
yields up to time t-1(Kumar and Persaud 2001).9
4.1  Selecting a list of stressful events
The list of events was drawn from a review of every Bank of Canada Annual Report since 1977
and every Monetary Policy Report since 1995. Events were included if they were explicitly
identiﬁed as having had a signiﬁcant impact on Canadian markets. In some cases, events were
broken into stages.
Nine events were largely Canadian in origin, including the mid-eighties bank failures, and the
early-nineties real estate collapse and subsequent bank losses and trust failures/takeovers. A
separate list was created for major Canadian-dollar events, including periods of heavy
intervention, steep declines, and record lows. This was done to determine whether respondents
viewed currency market stress as different from stress in other markets.
Twelve events were largely American in origin, including: the early-eighties bear market, October
1987 stock market crash, and the high-tech collapse of 2000; mid-eighties bank runs, Continental
Illinois failure, the Savings and Loans crisis,17 and the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM)
failure; the 1990 junk bond collapse; the currency accords of 1985 and 1987; and the 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks.
Thirteen events originated outside of North America. These included: the ﬁrst and second less-
developed country (LDC) crises in the early eighties; the 1990 Nikkei collapse; the early-nineties
Scandinavian banking crises; the 1992 European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) crisis; the
bond market turmoil of 1994; the 1994 Mexican, 1997–98 Asian, and 1998 Russian crises; the
1999 Brazilian réal devaluation; and the 2001 Turkish and Argentinian crises.
4.2  Events that were broadly perceived to be stressful
Table 2 lists the events that were deemed to be the most stressful for the Canadian ﬁnancial
markets. A clear consensus emerged from the survey that problems in the domestic banking sector
have been very stressful. Despite their small size, the Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB) and
Northland Bank failures in 1985 were seen to have had the potential to adversely affect the
broader Canadian banking system. The large losses incurred by domestic banks as a result of the
LDC crises were also noted. The ﬁrst set of LDC bond defaults was seen as the pivotal stress
event. As well, the real estate price collapse of the early 1990s and its impact on banks’ balance
sheets was considered to be very stressful. Nevertheless, these three events are difﬁcult to tie to a
17. The Savings and Loans crisis cost U.S. taxpayers an estimated US$500 billion to US$1trillion.
Between 1988 and 1992, 882 U.S. banks went out of business.10
speciﬁc date. For example, respondents felt that the potential (but ultimately unrealized) effects
on the Canadian banking system created more stress than the actual failures of the small banks.
The second category of events that elicited a strong consensus was extreme market disruptions:
the 1987 stock market crash,18 11 September 2001, the Mexican crisis, Russia’s debt default, and
the LTCM failure. Respondents felt that volatility was a factor, but not a sufﬁcient condition, in
making these episodes stressful. A broad-based loss of conﬁdence seems to have been what set
these events apart from other periods of price volatility.
The Asian crisis was generally considered to be stressful, although there are few linkages, real or
ﬁnancial, between Canada and these markets. The Asian crisis ranked well above the Nikkei crash
of 1990, which eliminated 40 per cent of Japan’s market capitalization. The Asian crisis
precipitated a decline in commodity prices over the following year and a half, which resulted in a
deterioration in Canada’s macroeconomic fundamentals, and eventually helped trigger Russia’s
debt default.
The policy-induced spike in interest rates in 198119 was also widely viewed as very stressful.
4.3  Events that everyone agreed were not stressful
Few respondents felt that any of the U.S. or European banking events were very stressful for
Canada. For example, the Savings and Loans crisis and the collapse of Continental Illinois were
ranked 22 and 29 out of 40, respectively. Both had mean responses in the “not very stressful”
range. This is not surprising, given that there were few direct linkages between these troubled
institutions and the largely domestically owned Canadian ﬁnancial institutions.
4.4  What is stress in foreign exchange markets?
Two-thirds of respondents felt that defending the Canadian dollar by increasing interest rates did
not create stress in other interest-rate-sensitive markets. In fact, policy intervention was viewed as
a way to reduce stress by restoring overall market conﬁdence. A similar number felt that the dollar
“hitting a new low” was not inherently stressful, despite the attention this receives in the media.
Four-fifths of respondents felt that sufficiently large exchange rate movements are usually stressful.
Nevertheless, the eight most volatile periods for Canada’s exchange rate over the past 25 years did
18. TheTSE300lost27percentofitsvalueoverafewdaysinOctober1987.Duringthelastthreemonths
of1981andtheﬁrsthalfof1982,theTSXlostalmost45percentofitsvalue,butrespondentsfeltthis
was gradualenough to notconstitute high stress.
19. Five-year mortgagerates reached 21.75 per cent, and real short-term rates reached almost 9 percent.11
not receive particularly high rankings. It was far more likely that stress in other markets was
perceived to lead to volatility in the Canadian dollar.
5. Selecting Variables for the FSI
There are two important elements in constructing an FSI: the choice of variables and the
weighting scheme. This section deals with the variables; section 6 focuses on the weights.
Three alternative measures of ﬁnancial stress are constructed. The ﬁrst approach, called the
standard measure, uses variables based on the literature review covering the banking, foreign
exchange, debt, and equity markets. Second is the reﬁned measure: where possible, reﬁnements to
the variables are considered, to better extract information about stressful periods. Third, GARCH
estimation techniques (section 5.5) are used to extract volatility measures from price variables.
Table 3 shows the variables contained in each of these measures.
Because a primary goal was to create a timely FSI that could be used for current analysis, the
selection of variables is limited to those that are available on a daily basis.
5.1  Banking sector
Standard measure
In most of the literature on banking stress or crisis, no distinction is made between idiosyncratic
shocks in the banking sector and economy-wide shocks. For example, bank proﬁts, credit growth,
and loan losses, which are cyclical, and bank share prices, which tend to be highly correlated with
the overall stock market, are commonly used variables.
On the other hand, relative bank share prices tell us more about the idiosyncratic shocks that hit
the banking sector. We use a conventional measure of relative equity-return volatility,
b = cov(r,m) / var(m),
where r and m are the total returns, at annual rates, to the banking sector index and the overall
market index, respectively.20 When b is greater than 1, the volatility of total returns for bank
20. Inthiscase,biscalculateddailyusingaone-yearrollingtimeframe.Shorterrollingperiodsproducea
qualitativelysimilar,butnoisier,b.randmarecalculatedusingthedailyyear-over-yearchangeinthe
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) Bank & Trust Total Returns Index and the Standard & Poor’s TSX
(formerly the TSE 300) Total Returns Index, respectively. Both indexes are weighted by constituent
market capitalization. Total Returns are deﬁned as capital gains plusreinvested dividend
disbursements. The respective price indexes, rather than total returns indexes, are used prior to1986,
due to data availability.12
shares over the past year is greater than the volatility of total returns for the overall market. In this
case, greater volatility is interpreted to mean that the banking sector is relatively riskier.
Several types of risk spreads are also considered to proxy stress in the banking sector (see section
5.3.1 on risk spreads). The most popular spreads used in the literature are medium- or long-term
maturity subordinated bond yields, with the risk-free rate being the yield on government bonds
with matching maturities. A time series for subordinated bank bond yields is not directly available
for Canada, however. The closest available measures are corporate indexes with AA rated
constituents, which in Canada are most representative of the risk ratings of banks and insurance
companies.21
Reﬁned measure
We impose two conditions on our reﬁned measure of banking sector stress: (i) b > 1, and (ii) the
return to the bank index is lower than the market return. These two conditions imply that the
banking sector has a lower ex ante risk-adjusted return than the overall market, a potential signal
of elevated stress. For , or for superior performance, a value of zero is assigned to the reﬁned
variable.
5.2  Foreign exchange market
Standard measure
Foreign exchange stress manifests itself through several variables, depending on the type of
exchange rate regime. The literature on currency crises deals almost exclusively with ﬁxed or
tightly managed exchange rates. In countries that have such exchange rates, stress results in
signiﬁcant losses of ofﬁcial reserves, increases in interest rates, and, if great enough, a collapse in
the value of the currency.
According to our deﬁnition, stress can also occur when the exchange rate is ﬂoating. A
depreciation represents a loss to domestic currency holders. Unexpected volatility creates
uncertainty, which affects liquidity and thus the efﬁciency of the foreign exchange market. The
standard approach in the literature is to use a volatility measure, or more commonly a hybrid
volatility-loss measure such as the CMAX calculation. This paper uses the standard CMAX
approach,
21. ScotiaCapitalandMerrillLynchbothprovidecorporateindexesforCanadabyratingcategorybutnot
by sector. Given that the major Canadian banks and insurance companies, which represent the bulk of
ﬁnancialinstitutionassets,allhaveAAorA+ratings,andthatfewotherCanadiancorporationsdo,we
feel this is a reasonable approximation.
b 1 £13
CMAXt = xt / max [ x  (xt-j| j = 0,1,...,T ) ],
with T = one year (the most common time frame used in the literature).
Reﬁned measure
A ﬂuctuating currency is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, a ﬂoating exchange rate can alleviate
macroeconomic stress by absorbing external shocks, which may outweigh the loss in the
currency’s value. Under these conditions, the standard approach may produce a false signal of
stress. Therefore, to reﬁne the standard approach, the exchange rate is benchmarked to its short-
run fundamental value. Stress occurs when the exchange rate falls below its fundamental value
(i.e., an overshooting depreciation). When the exchange rate rises above its fundamental value,
the reﬁned measure takes on a value of zero. This is consistent with the consensus in the literature
that currency crises involve depreciations, and not appreciations. A signiﬁcant appreciation may
imply overvaluation, which we interpret as a leading indicator of stress, rather than a stressful
event.
The Amano and van Norden (1995) and Djoudad and Tessier (2000) exchange rate model is used
to approximate the Canadian dollar’s fundamental value. The predicted value of the short-run
Can$/US$ exchange rate is determined by,
Dln(rfx)t = a(ln(rfx)t-1 - b0 -bcln(comtot)t-1 - beln(enetot)t-1) + gintdift-1 + qDdebtdift-1 - et,
where rfx is the real exchange rate, comtot is an index of real non-energy commodity prices,
enetot is an index of real energy prices, intdif is the Canada-U.S. 90-day commercial paper rate
differential, and debtdif is the Canada-U.S. debt/GDP differential.
Because the model is based on fundamentals, the predicted value is assumed to approximate the
fundamental value of the currency. We also experiment with statistical benchmarking techniques,
such as the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter and autoregressive integrated moving-average (ARIMA)
models, using nominal, real, and effective exchange rates. These result in qualitatively similar
measures of stress, particularly during “peak” stress periods, as Figure 4 illustrates. The rapid
depreciation of the Canadian dollar in 1985 and in the ﬁrst half of 1986 is an exception.
Statistically, it was one of the most severe depreciations in the post-war period. The Amano and
van Norden model suggests that the depreciation was warranted by quickly deteriorating
fundamentals, since the actual exchange rate does not signiﬁcantly overshoot its predicted value.
Thus, the level of exchange rate stress during this period was not high according to this measure.
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5.3  Debt markets
5.3.1  Risk spreads
The spread between risky and risk-free bond yields is a function of expected losses. Spreads can
widen if expectations of future losses increase, or if greater uncertainty leads to lower conﬁdence
in the shape of the distribution, implying a higher dispersion of probable loss. Both factors are
indicative of ﬁnancial stress.
Standard measure
The covered Canada-U.S. 90-day treasury bill spread is used to proxy uncertainty in the domestic
government debt market.22 Assuming both obligations bear zero probability of default, the
covered interest parity (CIP) condition states that there should be a zero spread. This leaves
market uncertainty to explain any statistically signiﬁcant divergences. Such divergences are
indicative of greater stress.
A representative corporate bond spread is used to proxy risk in the corporate debt market.23
Corporate yield spreads are a combination of credit, market, and liquidity risk premiums (Duca
1999). Credit risk is a function of expected loss, and market and liquidity risks are a function of
risk and uncertainty. Therefore, any increase in the overall risk premium is indicative of greater
stress.
Reﬁned measure
A reﬁned corporate risk spread is calculated by adjusting for fundamental macroeconomic factors.
When the actual spread is above the fundamentally determined spread (i.e., the price of corporate
bonds appears to be excessively low), it is indicative of ﬁnancial stress. Otherwise, the reﬁned
measure takes a value of zero. We use the Elfner (2001) model to derive the fundamental value of
Canadian corporate bond spreads.24
22. Hedged using forwardcontracts.
23. The yield on the Scotia Capital all-Canadian corporate bond index with remaining maturities of 10
years or more minus government of Canada bonds with equivalent maturities.
24. The fundamental value is determined by four variables in a simple ordinary-least-squares regression
with the corporate yield spread as the dependent variable;the variables are (i) Moody’s Issuer Based
Default Rate, (ii) the 10-year Government of Canada bond yield, (iii) the Bank Rate, and (iv) the
Commodity Research Bureau’s price index.15
5.3.2  Liquidity measures
Standard measure
Turnover ratios and bid-offer spreads are both commonly used to gauge the liquidity of markets,
but the latter is more readily available. The bid-offer spread on 90-day Government of Canada
treasury bills is used to proxy liquidity risk in debt markets.25 A lower level of liquidity is
indicative of increased uncertainty on the part of market-makers.26 Therefore, a higher bid-offer
spread is interpreted as a sign of greater ﬁnancial stress.
A second aspect of liquidity risk is called funding risk. A common measure of funding risk is the
spread between the commercial paper rate and the treasury bill rate. This measure has been
interpreted as a proxy for short-run disintermediation, or credit crunches, in some empirical work.
For example, Gertler, Hubbard, and Kashyap (1990) for the United States, and Ng and Schaller
(1996) for Canada, ﬁnd evidence that the spread increases when information costs increase, such
as during periods of uncertainty. Although default risk on prime non-ﬁnancial commercial paper
is extremely low even during recessions, creditors may seek shelter in the more liquid treasury
market during such periods, reducing demand for commercial paper and thus pushing up
spreads.27
5.3.3  Deviations in short- from long-term interest rates
Standard measure
We use an inverted yield-curve measure to proxy interest rate shocks, as in the BCA index.
Implicitly, the long-run yield on government bonds is interpreted as the equilibrium interest rate.
When short-term interest rates rise above this equilibrium (a negative yield curve), stress is
exerted on debtors by increasing their short-term debt-servicing costs above the equilibrium level.
In our case, we use the average of 5- to 10-year Government of Canada benchmark yields minus
the 90-day commercial paper rate, because these are representative of yields and rates on actively
traded long- and short-term debt, respectively, in Canada.
25. Thedata usedtoconstruct thisseriesarebased onmiddaysurveysofdealersinCanadiangovernment
securities, beginning in August 1988. The spread is calculated as the difference between the lowest
quotedbidrateandthehighestquotedofferrate,evenifthesequotescomefromdifferentdealers.This
optimal “inside” spread is probably unrealistically narrow, but it isthe only one available.





90 days (depending on the commercial paper’s maturity date).16
5.4  Equity markets
Standard measure
Equity-market crises are most often measured by changes in stock market indexes or market
capitalization. Trading volume, turnover ratios, new stock issuance, margin accounts, and the
equity-risk premium also contain useful information about stress. As a ﬁrst approximation, the
CMAX calculation is used, which is common practice in the literature on emerging-market crises.
This measure is based on the daily TSX index as a percentage of its one-year high, and can
therefore be considered a hybrid volatility-loss measure.
Reﬁned measure
The equity-market stress measure is reﬁned by considering the equity-risk premium. Figure 5
shows three simple approaches to estimating the equity-risk premium. The premiums are based on
equity valuation techniques described in Hannah (2000). A high equity-risk premium is
interpreted as a sign of stress. A low equity-risk premium may indicate a stock market bubble,
which would be interpreted as a leading indicator of stress, but not stress per se. This is consistent
with the ﬁnancial-crisis literature, which characterizes stock market crashes, not bubbles, as
ﬁnancial crises.
Our preferred version of the equity-risk premium uses the difference between the annual return to
holding equities (the inverse of the forward price-to-earnings ratio, Et+1/Pt) and the return to
holding risk-free real return government bonds (r).28 More formally,
where rt is the risk premium, and Wt is the market’s information set at time t. As in Hannah
(2000), the long-term Canada Real Return Bond yield (r) is used, rather than a nominal bond
yield, since both earnings (E) and prices (P) are thought to rise with the overall price level. We
assume a constant real return of 4.25 per cent before 1992, when the Real Return Bond did not
exist.
28. This approach is derived from a simple valuation model alluded to in the Federal Reserve Board’s
Monetary Policy Report tothe Congress, which accompanied the Humphrey-Hawkins testimony on
22 July 1997. Source: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/1997/july/testimony.htm>.
rt Ei Wt it =
t 12 +
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Forward earnings are preferred to trailing earnings, because they contain information about
expectations, despite their well-noted positive bias.29 The dividend discount approach is not used
in the FSI because, during the period under study, dividends were declining in importance.
5.5  Applying GARCH techniques to stress variables
Many studies have found that asset-price series such as stock indexes and exchange rates exhibit
changes in variance over time (Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner 1992). These changes tend to be
serially correlated, with groups of highly volatile observations occurring together. It is very easy
for the changes to occur, because a ﬁnancial market in a state of uncertainty, such as the period
shortly after a stock market crash, will take some time to reach its new equilibrium trading range.
Conventional time-series models typically operate under the assumption of constant variance;
thus they ignore this time-varying characteristic of asset-price volatility.
In this light, Engle (1982) introduces the ARCH process, to allow the conditional variance to
change over time as a function of past errors while leaving the unconditional variance constant.
The basic set-up of an ARCH model is to regard the series of interest, y, as being a sequence of
independent, identically distributed random variables, et, with unit variance, multiplied by a factor
s, the standard deviation,
,
.
s can be modelled in many different ways. The simplest possibility is to let
,, .
This simple ARCH model is not entirely satisfactory, because the conditional variance depends on
only a single observation at t-1. As a result, many empirical applications of ARCH models specify
a relatively longer lag, to allow the variance to change more slowly. Bollerslev (1986) proposes
the GARCH model, which allows a longer memory and a more ﬂexible lag structure,
.
The simplest of such models is GARCH(1, 1), as follows:
,, , .
29. Expected earnings are aggregated by Thomson Financial I/B/E/S.
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In the literature, stock prices are typically modelled with a GARCH(1, 1), GARCH(1, 2), or
GARCH(2, 1) model, while exchange rate movements are mostly treated as a GARCH(1, 1)
process (Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner 1992). A GARCH(1, 1) framework is used to model the
TSX stock price index, the bank stock price index as a share of the TSX, and the Can$/US$
exchange rate.30 This technique allows us to better identify sudden “abnormal” movements in
these series and discount the importance of the volatilities after the initial impact.
6. Combining the Variables into a Single Index
The choice of how to combine the variables (the weighting method) is perhaps the most difﬁcult
aspect of constructing an FSI. The difﬁculty in choosing weights lies in the lack of a reference
series upon which different, meaningful weights can be derived and tested. Various weighting
techniques are considered, including: factor analysis, credit aggregate-based weights, variance-
equal weights, and transformations of the variables using their sample CDFs.31 In all cases, the
indexes are rebased such that they range in value from 0 to 100, with 100 being the maximum
historical value of the index.
The variables are all measured on a daily basis, and values for the same day are combined. The
decision to combine contemporaneous values, rather than leading and lagging values, is based on
a series of simple statistical and econometric tests. First, 10 leads and lags32 of each variable are
regressed on each of the other variables in the index. Any signiﬁcant leads or lags could signal a
conditional non-contemporaneous relationship. Only a handful of leads and lags are statistically
signiﬁcant out of over 1200 tested.33 The estimated coefﬁcients on these leads or lags are then
compared with the overall variation of the regressand, to test for spuriousness. None of the
30. We also experiment with GARCH(1, 2) and GARCH(2, 1) speciﬁcations. The results seem very
similar to those from the GARCH(1, 1) model.
31. Another possibleapproachistouseimplicitweightsfrom simple non-linearprobabilitymodels,such
as probit and logit. Usually, these models are used to estimate probabilities, where the dependent
variable isdichotomous. For the purposes of calculating implicit weights, however, both sides of the
equation wouldbe the same concept (i.e., ﬁnancial stress), just measured intwo different ways. The
stress variables are continuous, and therefore would be placed on the right-hand side of the equation.
The survey responses described in section 3 are dichotomous, and therefore would be placed on the
left-hand side. The coefﬁcients on the stress variables could then be interpreted as the vector of
weights, and the estimated value for the variable onthe left-hand side would be the implicit-weight
FSI. There are numerous technical questions associated with this methodology that remain
unanswered, sowe leave this experiment for future work.
32. Ten leads and lags corresponds toone month of data at the business frequency, which seems to be a
suitably longwindow to establish any relationship in daily variables.
33. EachvariableinTable3wasregressedagainst10leadsand10lagsofeachoftheothervariablesinits
category (standard, reﬁned, or GARCH), making 1220 unique lead/lag relationships to be tested.19
statistically signiﬁcant leads or lags is economically meaningful. A ﬁnal test computes all of the
unconditional cross-correlations between contemporaneous values of the variables. Correlations
range from slightly negative for the overall equity-market measures and the bank beta (to be
expected) to almost 50 per cent for the equity- and bond-market measures. Correlations tend to
increase during stressful periods, but in no case rise above 50 per cent, suggesting that each
variable contributes signiﬁcant unique information. The conclusion, therefore, is that combining
contemporaneous values of the variables is a reasonable approach.
6.1  Factor analysis
The basic idea of factor analysis is to extract weighted linear combinations (factors) of a number
of variables. In a two-variable example, the principal factor of the two variables is the least-
squared regression line between them. If one extends this example to multiple variables, one can
extract many factors by rotating the scatter plot of the observations. The criterion for the rotation
is to maximize the variance of the factor, while minimizing the variance around the factor, such
that the ﬁrst factor captures the most possible variances of the variables. Subsequent factors are
extracted in the same fashion to account for the remaining variances.
This technique has two main purposes: (i) to reduce the number of variables, and (ii) to detect the
structure in the relationships between variables. Many studies have applied factor analysis to a
large number of explanatory variables in forecasting models. For example, Stock and Watson
(1999) forecast GDP with a few factors derived from 215 monthly indicators, and ﬁnd that the
factor model outperforms various benchmark models. Combining the information content in 334
Canadian and 110 U.S. macroeconomic variables into a few representative factors, Gosselin and
Tkacz (2001) ﬁnd that factor models perform as well as more elaborate models in forecasting
Canadian inﬂation.
The factor analysis approach in this paper is partly motivated by the Chicago Fed National
Activity Index (CFNAI). Following the techniques of Stock and Watson (1989, 1999), the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago (2000) builds the index with factors from 85 monthly economic
indicators. The CFNAI is designed to be an alternative to GDP as a measure of the level of
economic activities. In theory, a similar index may also be derived to measure stress, reﬂecting the
structural movements in a group of ﬁnancial variables. It is tempting to include all variables
described in Table 1 as well as those that are believed to move contemporaneously with stress; for
example, bank proﬁts and consumer conﬁdence. Subject to data timeliness and availability, only
daily variables are considered. Factor analysis is applied to the three versions of the FSI: standard,20
reﬁned, and GARCH, using the principal-component technique proposed in Gosselin and Tkacz
(2001).
6.2  Credit weights
A second approach weights the variables by the relative size of each market to which they pertain.
The larger the market as a share of total credit in the economy, the higher the weight assigned to
the variable proxying stress in that market. Therefore, the weights have some economic meaning.
Since the relative size of each market varies over time, a chain-linked weighting scheme is used.
Total credit in the economy is measured by the sum of bank credit, corporate bonds, government
bonds, equities, and U.S.-dollar credit (Figure 6).34 U.S.-dollar credit is the amount of loans to,
and bonds issued by, Canadian residents denominated in U.S. dollars. For markets with more than
one stress proxy, the corresponding weight is split evenly.
6.3  Variance-equal weights
A variance-equal weighting method generates an index that gives equal importance to each
variable. It is the most common weighting method used in the literature. The variables are
assumed to be normally distributed, which is the primary drawback of this approach. The mean is
subtracted from each variable before it is divided by its standard deviation, hence the term
“variance-equal” weights.35 Both the arithmetic and geometric means of the variables are
considered in this paper. An index that uses the geometric mean and is chained monthly has the
desirable property of transitivity, which is not necessarily the case with the arithmetic mean.
Furthermore, the geometric mean is preferable when weights are unknown. On the other hand, the
components are standardized with mean zero, and, since the geometric mean requires positive
values, half of the observations must be ignored. This may not be a serious problem, if one is
concerned primarily with above-average values of stress.
34. Where bank credit isthe sum of consumer credit, residential mortgages, business loans, non-
residential mortgages, bankers’ acceptances, leasing receivables, and loans to the public sector, Bank
ofCanadaseriesB127,B982,B2322,B2303,B2327,B2308,andB399,respectively;corporatebonds
is the Bank of Canada series B2318; government bonds includes federal, provincial, and municipal
issues; equities isBank of Canada series B2319.
35. Historical data for bid-offer spreads were notavailable prior to 1988, so the pre- and post-1988
weights are adjusted accordingly.21
6.4  Transformations using sample CDFs
A somewhat similar approach to combining the variables uses a transformation based on their
sample cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), rather than assume normality by standardizing.
First, each variable is transformed into percentiles based on its sample CDF, such that the most
extreme values, corresponding to the highest levels of stress, are characterized as the 99th
percentile. The smallest values, corresponding to the lowest levels of stress, are characterized as
the ﬁrst percentile. Values about the median are characterized as the 50th percentile, and so on.
The transformed variables are unit-free and implicitly reﬂect all the moments of their
distributions, provided they are time stationary, regardless of whether the distribution is normal
(Prat-Gay and McCormick, 1999). (Recall that section 5.5 uses GARCH methods for variables
with conditional variances.) The transformed variables are then averaged using both chain-linked
arithmetic and geometric means. A value of 99 for the overall index corresponds to extreme high
levels of stress for all variables.
6.5  Comparison of weighting methods
Three quarters of the cross-correlations (Table 4) between the variously weighted stress indexes
increased during stressful periods. The correlations are also reasonably high, averaging 71 per
cent during stressful periods, but only 59 per cent during non-stress periods. Of the ﬁve different
weighting methods, factor analysis produces results that are not only less correlated during
stressful periods, but also not very highly correlated with the other measures. Nevertheless, Figure
7 illustrates how qualitatively similar the results are when two very different weighting techniques
(credit aggregate weights and factor analysis36) are applied to the standard stress variables.
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate two of the many possible methods of combining the subcomponent
stress variables. The reﬁned stress variables shown in Figure 8 are depicted proportionately to
their weight in the overall FSI at the bottom, using variance-equal weights. Similarly, the standard
stress variables in Figure 9 are depicted proportionately using credit aggregate weights. The
reasons for choosing these two versions are described in section 7.
36. First extracted factor.22
7. Which Index is Best?
The survey results have established a qualitative benchmark with which to compare and evaluate
the various stress measures where no benchmark was previously available. Table 5 presents some
summary statistics upon which a comparison might be made.
In the EWI literature (Appendix A), crisis indicators are often evaluated on their Type I and II
errors. Type I errors are the probability of failing to signal a crisis. Type II errors are the
probability of falsely signalling a crisis. The policy-maker will minimize these errors according to
its desired loss function. This paper uses similar probabilistic evaluation criteria where results of
the survey are deemed to represent “true” high-stress events. Therefore, the probability that a
measure fails to capture a high-stress event is,
,
where X is the quantitative measure of stress with threshold t; and C is a binary variable that
equals 1 if survey respondents felt Canadian ﬁnancial markets were under stress during the month
in question, and 0 otherwise. Similarly,
.
The threshold t can be varied to conduct sensitivity analysis. Table 5 uses a threshold of plus-one
standard deviation above the median. As the threshold is raised, the Type I errors increase, and
Type II errors decrease. For example, using t = +2s increases Type I errors by 8.6 percentage
points on average, and reduces Type II errors by 6 percentage points on average. A two-standard-
deviation threshold cuts off about 95 per cent of the sample, depending on the measure. The
choice of t does not signiﬁcantly alter the ordinal ranking of the measures.
7.1  Evaluating overall stress measures
As Table 5 indicates, the BCA and Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000) styles of FSI fail to
capture a large number of stressful events highlighted by the survey. This is not surprising, since
both measures use variables that appear to be more cyclically inﬂuenced than event-driven. For
example, the BCA’s FSI uses consumer conﬁdence, the long-term yield curve, and several debt
measures. The Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock style FSI uses bank loan-loss rates and corporate
bankruptcies, which tend to lag the economic cycle.37
37. Asstatedearlier,Bordo,Dueker,andWheelockcalltheirmeasureaﬁnancialinstabilityindex,butwe
feel it conforms more closely to our deﬁnition of an FSI, except with lagging measures of stress.
TypeI prob X t C 1 = < () =
TypeII prob X t C 0 = > () =23
On the other hand, nine of the eleven stress measures that are calculated in this paper outperform
the BCA and Bordo FSIs in terms of Type I errors. Many of the variables in these stress measures
capture extreme movements, usually in market prices, driven by short-term shocks. Most of the
standard and reﬁned stress measures capture 75 to 85 per cent of the stressful events highlighted
by the survey. The GARCH variable indexes do not perform as well. The factor-analysis
weighting technique performs poorly, with high Type I errors.
Every empirical index of stress we consider, including the Bordo and BCA indexes, shows a spike
in 1984, which does not correspond to survey responses. Respondents were asked to rank two
events in 1984: the bank run on Continental Illinois and the depreciation of the Canadian dollar to
74.9 U.S. cents (at the time, its lowest level in history). Neither event was ranked as very stressful
for the Canadian ﬁnancial system. In hindsight, two other notable events in 1984 that were not
explicitly mentioned in the survey perhaps should have been. World oil prices fell by almost 10 per
cent owing to quota cheating by OPEC members, which indirectly affected Canadian ﬁnancial
institutions via a sharp deterioration in the value of real estate loans and oil-related debt and
equity in western Canada. Also, Canadian interest rates rose sharply through the year, a result of
“the reaction in U.S. ﬁnancial markets to the rapidly expanding U.S. economy, the associated high
rates of growth of money and credit and the policy response of the U.S. monetary authorities.”38
Based on a visual inspection of the variables used in the various indexes, it appears that the
indirect effects of the oil-price shock and the sharp increase in interest rates are the primary
reasons for the observed spike in stress in 1984.
In terms of best overall performance, the credit-weighted standard-variable index has the lowest
Type I error, at 13 per cent, and the lowest Type II error, at 33 per cent. This is one of the simplest
indexes to construct of the thirteen considered. Since it performs well and is simple to interpret
and communicate, we suggest that it be used as the FSI for Canada and tested further.
7.2  Evaluating individual market measures
The factors inﬂuencing innovations in the various FSI measures are probably of greater analytic
interest. Table 6 breaks the FSIs down into their subcomponents and compares their Type I and
Type II error performance with crisis variables commonly used in the literature (section 3). The
crisis variables, most of which are binary and have until now been applied only to emerging-
market countries, are constructed using Canadian data. The high stress or crisis threshold (t) is
chosen based on the threshold suggested by the source in the literature, or on plus-one standard
38. Bank of CanadaAnnual Report, 1984.24
deviation if no explicit threshold is stated for stationary series, or on the upper Bollinger Band for
non-stationary series.39
The most striking result is the size of the Type I errors associated with the binary crisis variables
that form the basis of most research on EWI models. Although these variables were not intended
to be applied to industrialized countries, this result brings into question the relevance of existing
EWIs for a country such as Canada. It also suggests a completely novel approach to predicting
ﬁnancial distress will be required for Canada.
The Type I errors are also fairly high for the individual variables used in the FSIs. On average,
between one-third and half of the market-speciﬁc events identiﬁed as very stressful by survey
respondents were not identiﬁed as such by the respective market variables.
7.2.1  Evaluation of the banking sector measures
The survey identiﬁed three stressful episodes for the Canadian banking sector: the LDC loan
losses (which coincided with domestic and global interest rate volatility in the early 1980s); the
CCB and Northland Bank failures, and their subsequent effects on other small banks; and the
1992 peak in loan losses (largely due to commercial real estate).40 The Vila (2000) CMAX and
standard FSI variables captured the loan-loss periods, but both “failed” to signal the small-bank
failures and subsequent effects as high-stress events (hence the 50 per cent Type I error rate). The
failures and their aftershocks appear to have been too small to disrupt markets, and hence did not
create stress in the system according to these empirical measures.
We prefer the standard FSI measure (a combination of bank share b‘s and bond yield spreads),
over the bank share price measure from Vila (2000), although both have the same Type I errors.
The latter is too sensitive to overall equity-market movements, which may not reﬂect stress
speciﬁc to the banking sector.
7.2.2  Evaluation of the foreign exchange measures
Although there was no clear consensus on when, if at all, Canadian foreign exchange markets
have come under stress, we exercise some judgment and interpret respondents’ comments to
determine the following test periods: the 1984 oil-price collapse (which affected Canada’s terms
39. The upper Bollinger Band is the moving average plusone standarddeviation of a series. The moving
window isdictated by the time-varying moments of the series.
40. The exact dates are:March to December 1982, September 1985 (CCB and Northland failures) to
March 1986 (effectson other small banks), and 1992(fallout from the real estate collapse and trough
in the credit qualitycycle for the banks).25
of trade), the 1985 pre-Plaza turmoil, the European ERM crisis, the peso crisis, the Asian crisis,
and the Russian/LTCM crisis.41
The standard CMAX measure seems to provide the best match with the survey. This simple
measure is good at capturing large declines in the exchange rate over a 12-month horizon, which
occurred during the above episodes. The GARCH volatility measure, which captures large
movements from day to day, performed almost as well. Therefore, a combined measure of
depreciation and volatility would seem to best capture exchange rate stress.
One might argue that stress in the foreign exchange market is distinct because, over the period
under examination, monetary policy may have responded to this type of stress differently (for
example, by raising interest rates to offset inﬂationary pass-through effects). Figure 10 compares
the FSI, excluding the exchange rate variable, with those episodes of foreign exchange stress
highlighted by survey respondents. In 1984 and 1985, there were two high-stress foreign
exchange episodes when all of the other markets appeared to be calm. However, during the 1992
ERM crisis, the 1995 peso crisis, the 1997–98 Asian crisis, and the 1998 Russian and LTCM
crises, the index (based on non-foreign exchange variables) reaches high levels.
To the extent that ﬁnancial stress and currency stress appear to be highly contemporaneous over
the past 15 years, and because survey respondents drew a link between stress in other markets and
the currency market, it seems reasonable to use a single FSI to capture stress in all four major
markets. Figure 11 illustrates, in fact, that, because of the high correlation of stress across
markets, the inclusion or exclusion of foreign exchange stress does not alter the FSI signiﬁcantly.
This also holds true when the weights on the foreign exchange measures are doubled and tripled.
7.2.3  Evaluation of the equity-market measures
The GARCH measure performs the best in identifying stock market stress, and conﬁrms that the
October 1987 stock market crash was the most severe stress event.42 Interestingly, none of the
measures identiﬁed 11 September 2001 as a high-stress event for equity markets. The TSX fell
sharply when it reopened on 13 September (the 49th largest daily decline for the index since
1956), but volatility was not extreme afterwards. Similarly, measures of the equity-risk premium
did not increase signiﬁcantly. Although new share issuance was weak, it had been weak long
41. The exact dates relevant toCanada are: February 1984, February 1985, September to December 1992
(ERMcrisis),December1994toJanuary1995(pesocrisis),FebruarytoApril1998(Asiancrisis),and
September to December1998 (Russian/LTCM crisis).
42. The exact dates relevant toCanada are: October 1987, September to December 1998 (Russian/LTCM
crisis), September to December 2000 (high-tech collapse), and September to December2001 (11
September).26
before September. And share turnover was clearly zero during the time the market was closed.
This explains why none of the equity-market variables that we considered isolated 11 September
as a particularly stressful episode.43
7.2.4  Evaluation of the debt-market measures
The FSI standard measures of debt-market stress have the lowest Type I and II errors.44 The
reﬁned measure uses the same variables, except that it adjusts the corporate bond spread using the
Elfner (2001) valuation model. This adjustment alone increases the Type I error by 20 percentage
points. Given the added problem of model uncertainty, there is considerable room to improve this
reﬁnement in future work.
Empirically, the Asian crisis was not identiﬁed as being immediately stressful. On the other hand,
the Russian/LTCM crisis appeared to be very stressful, regardless of the measure used. It can be
argued that the Asian crisis precipitated Russia’s debt default through a negative-terms-of-trade
shock, which was the same channel that transmitted stress to Canadian markets.
7.3  How to interpret the level of the FSI
A primary goal of the FSI is to provide a “snapshot” of the current degree of stress in the ﬁnancial
system. Nevertheless, interpreting the index remains a challenge. In this section, we address only
some of the important issues.
Since the FSI is mean-reverting by construction, the level of the index should provide more useful
information than its growth rate. In particular, we focus on the stress levels above the mean. These
observations indicate higher than “normal” stress levels. The change in the index over a certain
time period also provides useful information on the evolution of stress; for example, whether there
has been a sharp crash in the stock market or a gradual deterioration.
Since each variable in the FSI is standardized, the level of stress for a current event can be
compared only with that of an historical event in terms of their deviations from the mean. The
value of the index is likely to change when the sample period is altered, but the ordinal ranking of
two events should remain the same.
43. On the other hand, severalof the debt-market variables clearly singled out11 September as stressful,
so the overall FSI does reach extreme values during the month.
44. The exact dates relevant toCanada are: March to December 1982 (LDC crisis), fourth quarter 1992
(peak of corporate bond defaults), December 1994 to January1995 (peso crisis), and September to
December 1998 (Russian/LTCMcrisis).27
Simple benchmarks are assigned to the FSIs and their subcomponents to signal a high degree of
stress. In the literature, the choice of similar benchmarks has been largely ad hoc. We propose to
use a one-tailed two-standard-deviation threshold (97.5 per cent conﬁdence level under a normal
distribution). It isolates the events that were considered the most stressful in the survey.
By deﬁnition, the FSI captures the contemporaneous level of stress and is not expected to have
strong predictive power for future stresses or crises. Leading indicators of these events, which
may include lagged values of the FSI or its components, can be identiﬁed from models using the
FSI as the dependent variable.
One might expect ﬁnancial stress to be inversely correlated with consumer and business
conﬁdence measures. Figure 12 plots the FSI against the percentage of Canadian consumers
surveyed by the Conference Board of Canada who felt they would be ﬁnancially worse off over
the next six months. The correlation between the FSI and consumer conﬁdence appears to be
higher during recessions. There was a small deterioration in conﬁdence coinciding with the 1998
Russian/LTCM crisis. However, the 1987 stock market crash appears to have had little effect on
consumer sentiment. Figure 13 plots the FSI against the percentage of Canadian ﬁrms surveyed
by the Conference Board of Canada that expected their ﬁnancial situations to worsen over the next
six months. This measure of business conﬁdence is also highly cyclical. It demonstrates stronger
relationships with the FSI during recessions, and does not appear to be strongly coincident with
major ﬁnancial stress events. The sampling frequency and timing of the conﬁdence surveys may
affect these results.
8. Concluding Remarks
Several versions of the FSI compare favourably with measures commonly used in the literature by
providing a better match with the results of our survey. We prefer the standard-variable version,
using the credit aggregate weighting technique, because its components are simple to interpret
and communicate, it has economically meaningful weights, and it has the lowest Type I and Type
II errors.
The FSI provides an ordinal measure of stress in the ﬁnancial system. It is, however, a preliminary
attempt to quantify the stress spectrum. At the moment, changes in the FSI are useful in
evaluating whether stress is rising or falling, and in establishing time frames for extreme events.
We encourage future research on Canadian ﬁnancial stability to use the FSI as a reference series.
Since the FSI is a continuous-valued series, it could be more informative in developing an EWI
model than a standard dichotomous crisis variable. The FSI could be regressed on a number of28
lagged variables that are believed to possess leading information about stress or crises. The results
could then be used to construct measures of ﬁnancial fragility, which indicate the likelihood that
an exogenous shock will affect the degree of stress, given perceived vulnerabilities in ﬁnancial
structures and conditions (see Diagram 1 on page 3).
Another extension could be to use the FSI to explain changes in real economic variables, such as
GDP and investment. By deﬁnition, extremely high levels of ﬁnancial stress impair not only the
ﬁnancial system but also result in signiﬁcant losses in the real economy. Lower levels of stress
may also affect the real economy to a lesser extent: for example, they could result in tight liquidity
conditions and asset-price instability, both of which could lead to an increase in the cost of capital
and reduce private investment and consumption.
One could also extend the methodologies developed in this paper to create FSIs for other
countries. Validating the results would be difﬁcult, however, without conducting a comparable
survey of ﬁnancial experts in those countries. Provided such FSIs could be developed, a weighted
combination—based, for example, on ﬁnancial or trade linkages—could be useful for analyzing
ﬁnancial contagion and for assessing the external environment faced by the Canadian ﬁnancial
system. This could serve as a useful tool in domestic macroeconomic and ﬁnancial analysis.29
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Table 1: Variables that Contain Information about Financial Stress
Based on a review of the EWI literature and authors’ suggestions. This list is not intended to be exhaustive.
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Table 2: Events Deemed to be the Most Stressful to Canadian Financial Markets
Based on an internal Bank of Canada survey of senior policy-makers and economists. The rank is based on the highest














October 1987 stock market crash 1 2.6 3 96
Reputational aftershocks from bank
failures (1985–86)
2 2.6 3 88
Events of 11 September 2001 3 2.6 3 96
LDC crises (early 1980s) 4 2.6 3 96
early-1990s bank losses 5 2.4 3 92
August 1981 spike in interest rates 6 2.4 3 88
Asian crisis (1987–98) 7 2.4 3 100
CCB and Northland failures (1985) 8 2.3 3 92
Mexican crisis (1994–95) 9 2.3 3 100
Russian debt default (1998) 10 2.2 2 100
LTCM collapse (1998) 11 2.2 2 100
High-tech price collapse (2000) 12 2.1 2 10035
(continued)
Table 3: Selected Variables for the FSI
The variables below are scaled by their centred standard deviations.




calculated daily over a rolling 1-
year time horizon, where
r = year-over-year percentage
change in the TSX Bank & Trust
Total Returns Index (formerly
the TSE Bank & Trust Total
Returns Index; source: Datast-
ream). Prior to 1986, the year-
over-year percentage change in
the TSE Bank & Trust Price Index
(source: Toronto Stock
Exchange).
m = year-over-year percentage
change in the S&P/TSX Total
Returns Index (formerly the TSE
300 Total Returns Index; source:
Datastream). Prior to 1986, the
year-over-year percentage
change in the TSE 300 Price
Index (source: Toronto Stock
Exchange).
b as calculated in the FSI
standard version, but only
when b > 1 and then only
when r < m.
GARCH (1,1) volatility of rel-
ative bank share prices
(BX/TSX),
BX = TSX Bank & Trust Price
Index (formerly the TSE
Bank & Trust Price Index;
source: Toronto Stock
Exchange).
TSX = S&P/TSX Price Index
(formerly the TSE 300
Price Index; source:
Toronto Stock Exchange).
See section 5.5 for more
details.
Bank bond yield spread (approxi-
mated with the AA-rated long-term
corporate bond yield, of which most
constituents are ﬁnancial issuers,
minus the Government of Canada
long-term bond yield; source: Scotia
Capital).




canC6t/max[canC6  (canC6t-j|j =
0,1,...,T)] where T = 365.
That is, the daily value of the
Canadian effective exchange rate
(canC6) as a per cent of its maxi-
mum value over the preceding
365calendardays(i.e.,theCMAX
method).
canC6 = a weighted combination of
the U.S. dollar (85.84%), the euro
(5.95%),theJapaneseyen(5.27%),
theU.K.pound(2.17%),theSwiss
franc (0.42%), and the Swedish
krona (0.35%). Source: Bank of
Canada.
The short-run predicted
value for the Canada/US
dollar exchange rate minus
the actual value, expressed as
a percentage. A value of zero
is assigned if the actual
exchange rate is above the
short-run predicted value.
Source: Bank of Canada.
See section 5.2 for more
details.
GARCH (1,1) volatility of the
Canadian effective exchange
rate (canC6).





TSXt/max[TSX  (TSXt-j|j =
0,1,...,T)] where T = 365.
That is, the S&P/TSX Price Index
(formerly the TSE 300 Price
Index) as a per cent of its maxi-
mum value over the preceding
365calendardays(i.e.,theCMAX
method). Source: Toronto Stock
Exchange.
rt = Et / TSXt - rt
rt = the S&P/TSX equity risk
premium at time t.
Et = consensus analysts’ fore-
casts of 12-month forward
earnings as at time t
(source: Thomson Finan-
cial I/B/E/S) for the
S&P/TSX (formerly the
TSE 300).
TSXt = as per FSI standard.
rt = The Government of Can-
ada Real return bench-
mark long-term bond
yield at time t (source:
Bank of Canada). A con-
stant real return of 4.25%
is assumed prior to 19
November 1991, when
this series began.
GARCH (1,1) volatility of the
S&P/TSX Price Index
(formerly the TSE 300
Price Index; source:
Toronto Stock Exchange).




Corporate bond yield spread (All-
rated long-term corporate bond
yield minus the Government of
Canada long-term bond yield;
source: Scotia Capital).
Corporate bond yield spread
(as calculated for the FSI
standard version) but only
when it is below “fair value”
spread as described in
Appendix C. A value of zero
is assigned if the actual
spread is above its “fair
value.”
Same as FSI standard.
Canada-US covered interest rate dif-
ferential
(1 + rt*) = Ft/St* (1 + rt)
r* = U.S. Government 90-day
Treasury bill rate as at noon on
day t
Ft = 90-day forward rate for the
US-Canada dollar exchange rate
as at noon on day t
St = spot rate for the US-Canada
dollar exchange rate as at noon
on day t
rt = Government of Canada 90-
day Treasury bill rate as at noon
on day t
Source: Bank of Canada.
Same as FSI standard. Same as FSI standard.
Liquidity spread
Government of Canada 90-day
Treasury bill bid-offer spread, 30-
day moving average (source: Bank
of Canada).
Same as FSI standard. Same as FSI standard.
Table 3: Selected Variables for the FSI





paper rate minus 30-day Treasury
bill rate (source: Bank of Canada).
Same as FSI standard. Same as FSI standard.
Inverted yield curve
the average of 5-10 year Govern-
ment of Canada benchmark bond
yields minus the Canadian 90-day
commercial paper rate (source:
Bank of Canada).
Same as FSI standard. Same as FSI standard.
Table 3: Selected Variables for the FSI
The variables below are scaled by their centred standard deviations.38
Table 4: Cross-Correlations of Stress Measures (in per cent)
Correlations during stress periods (based on section 6 results) are shown on the upper diagonal. Correlations during non-stress
periods are shown on the lower diagonal. Shaded values denote greater correlation during stressful periods.


























































85 99 94 57 90 80 90 61 62 85 76 82 85 49 66 45
geomet-
ric mean
82 84 79 33 74 70 72 36 58 76 86 75 74 33 50 36
credit
aggregate
97 85 92 54 89 78 91 62 63 89 79 91 81 47 56 33
sample
CDF
93 80 93 66 88 75 87 67 73 81 68 80 83 52 72 53
factor
analysis





















76 65 76 74 56 87 99 65 76 85 70 85 72 38 61 41
geomet-
ric mean
61 72 67 60 48 83 84 54 70 81 66 81 66 22 60 46
credit
aggregate
75 68 80 78 58 98 83 64 78 87 71 88 71 36 53 36
sample
CDF
52 51 59 60 72 67 61 71 52 53 55 64 64 16 51 34
factor
analysis




















70 58 71 73 66 66 51 69 71 51 87 99 87 46 19 -1
geomet-
ric mean
41 41 41 43 47 35 35 37 43 29 76 86 78 42 12 -3
credit
aggregate
70 64 74 73 65 68 57 72 70 56 98 75 83 44 14 -5
sample
CDF
61 48 61 65 61 55 38 58 62 39 93 71 93 68 58 46
factor
analysis
43 34 40 46 70 31 21 32 36 45 71 64 69 75 -21 3
BCA Financial Stress
Index
30 20 26 29 30 18 9 12 16 7 13 4 -12 4 23 85
Bordo et al.
FSI
32 22 25 30 8 8 1 7 4 -9 -7 -13 3 -11 29 75
Note: The BCA and Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000) FSIs are based on their respective U.S. methodologies using Canadian data as closely matched in deﬁni-
tion as possible. Neither the BCA nor Bordo and his co-authors actually construct a Canadian FSI. Weighting methods compared above are the arithmetic mean,
geometric mean, and weights derived from credit aggregates.39
Table 5: How Closely do the Stress Measures Match the Survey Results?
The stress measures are compared with the survey results using two criteria: (i) the Type I error, the probability of failing to report
a high-stress event, and (ii) the Type II error, the probability of falsely reporting a high-stress event. Shading denotes a variable
with the lowest Type I error.
Type I error (%)
“failure rate”






















Credit aggregates 13 33
Sample CDF 22 42



















Credit aggregates 27 36
Sample CDF 44 48


















Sample CDF 33 41
Credit aggregates 25 38




Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000)
Financial Stress Index
64 15
Note: For those measures without explicit threshold values, plus-one standard deviation is used, as in Eichengreen, Rose, and
Wyplosz (1996). Percentages are based on the number of months. Survey respondents identiﬁed 55 out of 276 months as stressful.40
Table 6: How Closely do the Subcomponents Match the Survey Results?
The Type I error is the probability that the measure fails to report a high-stress event (based on the survey results for the relevant market).
The Type II error is the probability a high-stress event is falsely reported. Shading denotes the variable with the lowest Type I error.


































Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)
non-performing assets
100 0
Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999)
deposits/GDP
83 14







bank share price crashes
51 9
FSI standard
bank beta and bank spread
51 14
FSI reﬁned
beta > 1 and weak share performance and bank spread
74 12
FSI GARCH
bank share price GARCH volatility
66 20
Bank Credit Analyst
relative bank share prices (versus 2-year moving trend)
100 21
Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000)










































Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995, 1996)
nominal exchange rate, ofﬁcial reserves, interest rates
82 6
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996)
nominal exchange rate, ofﬁcial reserves
88 0
FSI standard






























































































Bond yield spread, interest rate differential, bid-offer spread, CP-Tbill spread, yield curve
15 9
FSI reﬁned
Same as above, except bond yield spread is replaced by undervaluations
35 12
Bank Credit Analyst
Private debt/GDP, market leverage, new bond issuance
65 13
Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000)
Corporate bankruptcies, real interest rate, bond yield spread
25 18
Note: Percentages are based on months. There were 276 months in the sample, of which: 35 months were classiﬁed as stressful for the banking sector (LDC,
CCB, and Northland, 1992 loan losses); 17 as stressful for the foreign exchange market (oil-price collapse, pre-Plaza, ERM, peso, Asian, and Russian crises); 12 as
stressful for the stock market (Oct. 87, Asian, and Russian crises, high-tech collapse, and 11 Sep.); and 20 as stressful for debt markets (LDC, late-92, peso, and
Russian/LTCM crises).
For those measures without explicit threshold values, +1 standard deviation is used, as in Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996). The BCA variables are
trended to the best of the authors’ knowledge in the same fashion as that employed by the BCA’s U.S. index.41
























Figure 1: Financial Stress Index
Bank Credit Analyst style for Canada
The actual BCA index uses U.S. data and their exact methods are not published.
Vertical shaded regions denote periods of high financial stress (according to survey responses in section 6).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on McClellan (2001). Last value: Mar 03

























Figure 2: Financial Stress Index
Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000) style for Canada
* The U.S. index is reproduced using Canadian data (loan losses, corporate bankruptcies, real interest rate, bond spreads).
  Vertical shaded regions denote periods of high financial stress (according to survey responses in section 6).
  Source: Authors’ calculations. Last value: Mar 0242

















High    
Median  
Low     
JP Morgan Liquidity, Credit & Volatility Index
Financial Stress Index
Figure 3: Financial Stress
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Kantor and Caglayan (2002).
Last value: 26 Mar 03




















Less     
stress   
More     
stress   
Fundamentals-based model* Hodrick-Prescott filter**
Figure 4: Canadian-Dollar Deviations
from Short-run Predicted Value
*Amano and van Norden (1995) and Djoudad and Tessier (2000), US$/Can$ exchange rate.
**Effective (C6) exchange rate.
Vertical shaded regions denote periods of financial market stress (according to survey responses in section 6).
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Bank of Canada. Last value: May 0343



















Based on dividend yield
Based on 12-month forward earnings yield (consensus)
Based on 12-month trailing earnings yield
Figure 5: S&P/TSX Composite Index Risk Premiums
Vertical shaded regions denote periods of financial market stress (according to survey responses in section 6).
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Bank of Canada, I/B/E/S. Last value: Apr 03
Figure 5 plots the equity-risk premium using the dividend yield discount method, and both trailing and forward earnings yields. Risk
premiums rose steeply when the stock market crashed on 19 October 1987, and peaked shortly thereafter. Note that the measure using the
trailing earnings yield is consistently lower than the one using expected forward earnings. This remains true even when one uses actual
forward earnings, which suggests that consensus expectations are consistently overly optimistic.44






















Figure 6: Canadian Credit Aggregates
 Vertical shaded regions denote periods of financial market stress (according to survey).
*U.S.-dollar-denominated bonds and loans to Canadian residents.
 Sources: Authors’ calculations, Bank of Canada, Statistics Canada. Last value: Sep 02



































Figure 7: Comparison of Weighting Techniques*
*The two techniques that produced the greatest difference in results.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Last value: Mar 0345











  Bank spread
+ Bank beta
+ Liquidity spread
+ Corp. bond risk
+ Covered interest









  Index (refined)
Figure 8: Components of the Financial Stress Index
(refined variables, variance-equal weights)
Variables graphed proportionately to weight in index.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Last value: Mar 0346











  Bank spread
+ Bank beta
+ Liquidity spread
+ Corp. bond spread
+ Covered interest






   crashes
+ CP-Tbill spread
= Financial Stress
   Index
Figure 9: Components of the Financial Stress Index
(standard variables, credit aggregate weights)
Variables graphed proportionately to weight in index.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Last value: Mar 0347























Stressful periods in Canadian-dollar exchange markets*
FSI excluding foreign exchange variables (FSX)
Figure 10: Linkages Between Foreign Exchange Stress
and Other Types of Financial Stress
*According to survey responses. Last value: Feb 03
Source: Authors’ calculations.























Stressful periods in Canadian-dollar exchange markets*
FSI including foreign exchange stress (standard variables, variance-equal weights)
FSI excluding foreign exchange stress (standard variables, variance-equal weights)
Figure 11: FSI with and without Exchange Rate Stress
*According to survey responses. Last value: Mar 03
Source: Authors’ calculations.48




















FSI (standard, credit weights)
Percentage of consumers who expect to be financially worse off in six months
Figure 12: Financial Stress and Consumer Confidence
Shaded regions denote Canadian recessions.





























FSI (standard, credit weights)
Percentage of firms who expect financial conditions will be worse over the next 6 months
Figure 13: Financial Stress and Business Confidence
Shaded regions denote Canadian recessions.






Appendix A: Literature on Early Warning Indicators
The increasing incidence of ﬁnancial crises in recent years has led to greater efforts to identify
their causes and advance signals. Since the late 1990s, there has been an explosion of studies on
EWI. Many of these studies focus on selecting and weighting indicators that are most useful in
predicting crises. Hawkins and Klau (2000) ﬁnd that these studies generally follow three
approaches, as described below.
A.1 Qualitative comparison
These studies graphically compare various indicators immediately preceding a ﬁnancial crisis
with those in normal times or in countries where there was no crisis. Examples include
Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (2000), Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995), Eichengreen and
Rose (1998), Frankel and Rose (1996), Glick and Moreno (1999), and the ﬁrst part of Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1999).
A.2  Econometric modelling
This approach uses regressions to explain some measure of ﬁnancial pressure (mostly exchange
rate pressure), or logit or probit models to test whether indicators are associated with a higher
probability of a ﬁnancial crisis. Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (2000), Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Eichengreen and Rose (1998),
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995), Frankel and Rose (1996), Glick and Moreno (1999),
Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999), Kruger, Osakwe, and Page (1998), Milesi-Ferritti and Razin
(1998), Persaud (1998), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), and Tornell (1999) use this approach.
A.3  Non-parametric estimation
Studies that use this approach evaluate the usefulness of a number of different variables in
signalling a pending or potential crisis. Threshold values are chosen for each indicator to strike a
balance between the risk of many false signals and the risk of missing the crisis altogether (i.e., to
minimize the noise-to-signal ratio). Often, indexes of fragility are subsequently constructed by
counting the number of indicators that exceed their respective threshold values. Examples in this
group of studies include Edison (2000), Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000), Kaminsky,
Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998), Kaminsky (1999), and the second part of Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999).
Most of these studies are done in a multi-country framework and typically focus on developing
countries where ﬁnancial crises occur more frequently. There is a limited literature on EWIs for50
developed countries. The central banks of Sweden, Norway, and England have published ﬁnancial
stability indicators that cover conditions in the macroeconomy, ﬁnancial markets, and ﬁnancial
institutions. The Bank of Canada has also been developing a package of such indicators,
published as the Financial System Review. The IMF has been developing “macroprudential
indicators” as part of a program to strengthen the international structure. To date, however, much
of this effort involves the “qualitative comparison” approach. Few have created econometric
models that formally test the explanatory and predictive abilities of the proposed indicators.
Moreover, it is hard to identify conventionally deﬁned “crises” in most developed countries. Thus
there is relatively little qualitative information with which to test ﬁnancial stability measures.51
Appendix B: Survey on Financial Stress
We are currently experimenting with methods of measuring ﬁnancial stress. We would
like to know how our measures of stress correspond to your view of historical events.
Financial stress is a gauge of the severity of disruptions to ﬁnancial markets and institu-
tions. Depending on their nature, situations of extreme stress are often referred to as cri-
ses, crashes, collapses, runs, or credit crunches.
We would like you to rank the following events in terms of how stressful they were for
the Canadian ﬁnancial system, where
• 1 = not stressful
• 2 = somewhat stressful
• 3 = very stressful
• DK = don’t know
Please feel free to add comments in the margin.
Date / Event / description
• 1981 Canadian mortgage rates hit record high of 21.75%
• 1981 TSE 300 crashes by 18%
• 1982 LDC debt crisis Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Hungary, Yugoslavia receive IMF interim
bridge ﬁnancing. Canada contributes $U.S. 250 million. IMF increases country quotas
by 47.5% to cover mounting costs; international commercial banks are highly exposed
to bad debts.
• 1982 Several small, mid-western US banks collapse and this leads to bank runs on Conti-
nental Illinois, Chase, and several other large US banks.
• 1984 US Fed and FDIC rescue of Continental Illinois ($US 10 billion) after failed acquisition
initiates a large run on the bank.
• 1985 Canadian small bank failures Bank of Canada facilitates $255 million support pack-
age, as lender of last resort, to the Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB). Fearing conta-
gion, Northland Bank asks for similar assistance.
• 1985 Emergency bank holiday in Ohio to stave off run on deposits
• 1985 First signiﬁcant Savings and Loans failures in Maryland (not yet widespread)
• 1985 Second LDC crisis Canada contributes short-term bridge ﬁnancing to Argentina, Mex-
ico and Nigeria which cannot meet their debt obligations; Baker initiative coordinates
debt rescheduling.
• 1985 Plaza Accord Before the Accord: the trade-weighted US dollar hits a record high. After
the Accord: the US dollar falls by 10% in two weeks (US initiates coordinated devalua-
tion with German and Japanese support)
• 1985 CCB and Northland bankruptcies (Bank of Canada has made combined advances of
$Cdn. 1.8 billion). The bankruptcies have ripple effects: a number of other banks ﬁnd it
“impossible to retain sufﬁcient deposits to fund their loans”.
• 86-87 Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis. US Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) declared bankrupt
• 1987 Brazil declares debt service moratorium LDC borrowing rates soar
• 1987 Louvre Accord Before the Accord: the US dollar hits record low (50% off its peak in
1985). After the Accord: the US initiates coordinated intervention to support the dollar
(lasts about 18 months)52
• 1987 “Black Friday” - TSE crashes 17% in two trading days (parallels US crash)
• 1989 “Grey Thursday” - TSE 300 falls 3.5%
• 1990 US junk bond market collapse
• 1990 Nikkei crash Tokyo stock market falls by 50%
• 90-92 large loan losses at Canadian banks and trusts due to real estate price collapse (aver-
age residential house price falls $20,000, commercial property prices fall almost 40%
over the next 6 years).
• 91-92 Scandinavian banking crises
• 1992 ERM crisis - European Exchange Rate Mechanism is effectively abandoned
• 1992 Royal Trust distress (taken over by Royal Bank in 1993)
• 1992 Sovereign Life collapse (Calgary-based)
• 1994 Confederation Life collapse
• 1994 Global bond market reversal - price volatility after shift in expectations
• 1995 Mexican crisis - Mexican bond spreads soar to almost 2500 basis points over US Treas-
uries
• 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis begins with Thai Bhat devaluation and spreads to Malaysia,
Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines.
• 1998 Russian/LTCM crisis - Russia defaults on debt, emerging market bond spreads soar to
1700 basis points above US Treasuries. Long-Term Capital Management, a highly lever-
aged hedge fund, sustains massive losses. The NY Fed arranges a creditor bailout.
• 1999 Brazilian currency crisis - réal declines by over 40%
• 2000 High-tech stock market bubble bursts - Nasdaq falls by 40%, TSE falls by 19%
• 2001 Turkish currency crisis - lire falls 30% in one day
• 2001 Argentinian ﬁnancial problems - Argentinian bond yields soar almost 2500 basis
points above US Treasuries
• 2001 Terrorist attacks in the US
You may have noticed that descriptions of the above events did not explicitly mention
Canadian dollar volatility and/or weakness.
• Do you feel that rapid exchange rate movements are stressful?
• Is there something inherently stressful about the Canadian dollar “hitting a new low”?
• Does raising interest rates to defend the dollar cause ﬁnancial stress in other markets?
How would you characterize the degree of stress in Canadian currency markets during
the following periods
• November 1976 dollar falls 7 cents from $1.03
• January 1979 dollar hits new low of 83.3 cents
• July 1984 new low of 74.9 cents
• February 1985 falls 4 cents
• new low of 71.3 cents
• February 1986 falls 2 cents (oil price crash)
• new low of 69.5 cents
• January 1987 dollar jumps 3 cents
• November 1991 dollar peaks at 89.3 cents
• Aug-Sep 1992 falls 4 cents (ERM spillover)
• January 1995 falls 4 cents (Mexican crisis)
• October 1997 falls 2 cents (Asian crisis)
• Aug-Sep 1998 falls 3 cents (Russian crisis)
• new low of 63.4 cents
• September 2001 new low of 63.3 cents (US attacks)Bank of Canada Working Papers
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